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Background: Universal Health Coverage seeks to assure that everyone can obtain the health services they need
without financial hardship. Countries which rely heavily on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments, including informal
payments (IP), to finance total health expenditures are not likely to achieve universal coverage. The Republic of
Moldova is committed to promoting universal coverage, reducing inequities, and expanding financial protection. To
achieve these goals, the country must reduce the proportion of total health expenditures paid by households. This
study documents the extent of OOP payments and IP in Moldova, analyses trends over time, and identifies factors
which may be driving these payments.
Methods: The study includes analysis of household budget survey data and previous research and policy documents.
The team also conducted a review of administrative law intended to control OOP payments and IPs. Focus groups,
interviews, and a policy dialogue with key stakeholders were held to validate and discuss findings.
Results: OOP payments account for 45 % of total health expenditures. Sixteen percent of outpatients and
30 % of inpatients reporting that they made OOP payments when seeking care at a health facility in 2012,
more than two-thirds of whom also reported paying for medicines at a pharmacy. Among those who paid
anything, 36 % of outpatients and 82 % of inpatients reported paying informally, with the proportion increasing over
time for inpatient care. Although many patients consider these payments to be gifts, around one-third of IPs appear to
be forced, posing a threat to health care access. Patients perceive that payments are driven by the limited list of
reimbursable medicines, a desire to receive better treatment, and fear or extortion. Providers suggested irrational
prescribing and ordering of tests as drivers. Providers may believe that IPs are gifts and do not cause harm for patients
and the health system in general.
Conclusions: Efforts to expand financial protection should focus on reducing household spending on medicines and
hospital-based IPs. Reforms should consider ways to reduce medicine prices and promote rational use, strengthen
administrative controls, and increase incentives for quality health care provision.
Keywords: Eastern Europe, Health expenditures, Health policy, Health systems, Out-of-pocket payments, Informal
payments, Republic of Moldova, Universal health coverage* Correspondence: tvian@bu.edu
1Department of Global Health, Boston University School of Public Health, 801
Massachusetts Avenue, Crosstown Building 3rd floor, Boston, MA 02118, USA
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2015 Vian et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Vian et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:319 Page 2 of 15Background
The goal of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) is to assure
that all people have access to the health services they
need, of sufficient quality to be effective, and that people
do not suffer financial hardship in paying for health care
services [1]. Countries which rely heavily on out-of-pocket
(OOP) payments to finance total health expenditures are
not likely to achieve UHC, as formal user fees and infor-
mal payments can cause financial hardship and push
households into poverty [2–5]. Reliance on OOP pay-
ments also can result in greater inequality in use of
services based on socio-economic status [6–9].
Financial protection is a problem in many of the
Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries, with households
spending a larger and less predictable portion of total
resources on health compared with EU-15 countries [6].
Household OOP spending on health in EU-15 countries
accounts for 18 % of total health expenditures on aver-
age [6], whereas OOP spending accounted for over 28 %
of total health spending in seven out of eight FSU coun-
tries analyzed [10]. Informal payments (IPs) are espe-
cially problematic in Central Asia and Eastern Europe
[11–14]. In Bulgaria, 13 % of outpatients and 33 % of
inpatients reported paying informally for treatment [15],
while 26–29 % of Albanians were “suggested to make” a
payment for services that should have been provided
free of charge in government facilities, signifying these
were likely forced payments and not gifts [16].
The Republic of Moldova is one of the countries which
has struggled with high OOP payments, estimated at
44.9 % in 2011 [17], and with public concern over IPs
[18, 19]. With a population of 3.5 million and GDP per
capita of $2,038 (2012, data do not include the districts
on the left side of the river Dniester and the municipality
of Bender), Moldova is one of the poorest countries in
Europe although it has experienced economic growth in
recent years [20, 21].
In approaching health reforms to achieve UHC,
Moldova has taken what the World Health Organization
calls a “whole systems approach” [4] seeking not only to
create and expand health insurance enrollment, but also
to adopt health policies which would increase equity in
service use, improve efficiency and expand financial pro-
tection for all citizens [22–25]. The mandatory health in-
surance system was created by law in 1998 and became
operational in 2004 [26]. Administered by the National
Health Insurance Company (CNAM), the program pro-
vides access to an essential package of emergency, pri-
mary, and inpatient services without charge [18]. The
package of services includes drugs in inpatient settings
and a limited list of reimbursable medicines for out-
patient care [19, 26]. For a majority of conditions, family
doctors serve a gatekeeping function, and referral is
required to access secondary and tertiary services.An amendment to the Law on Mandatory Health
Insurance in 2009 ensured that families living below
the poverty line, even if formally self-employed, would
automatically receive fully subsidized health insurance
[26, 27]. Additional amendments in 2010 provided all
citizens, regardless of income level, with access to
free primary health care services provided by family
doctors [24] and pre-hospital emergency care services
[19]. To implement this reform, the health insurance
system allocated additional funding with a focus on
improving rural access. About 30 % of the insurance
program’s budget was spent on primary care including
prescription medicines in 2012 [28]. Funding has
strengthened the family medicine model and enhanced
autonomous management of primary care centers, inde-
pendent of hospitals, so they are able to separately con-
tract with CNAM [29]. Coverage under the mandatory
health insurance system was 79.7 % in 2011; however,
patients still often pay in the private sector for uncovered
services such as some high technology diagnostic tests,
medicines not on the Reimbursed Drugs List, and for sec-
ondary/tertiary services if they are not referred [18].
Targets set in CNAM’s institutional strategy propose
that by 2017 the insurance program will decrease the
share of OOP payments as a proportion of total health
expenditures to 36 %, decrease the share of expenditures
for medicines as a proportion of OOP payments to 65 %
while at the same time expanding the Reimbursed Drugs
List, and decrease the proportion of patients making IPs
at primary and outpatient care to 20 % and at hospitals
to 45 % (among those who paid anything for care).
CNAM plans to achieve these targets through the
expansion of health insurance coverage and benefits (as
mentioned above), and other strategies in the early
stages of implementation, including assuring protection
of the rights of insured people through better customer
service, complaint management, and a beneficiary pro-
tection system, and further increasing access and quality
of care by reducing waiting time to obtain services, con-
ducting medical audits, and using innovative performance-
based financing mechanisms for contracting with hospitals
[23].
At a broader level, health sector reforms since 2012
have tried to reduce OOP payments by gradually in-
creasing salaries of health workers [30], increasing
budget for covered prescription medicines, introducing
mandatory use of international non-proprietary names
(INN) in prescribing, and implementing a medicines pri-
cing policy reform whereby the manufacturer’s price is
set at the time of product registration using external ref-
erence price information [31]. Debates in recent years
have also recognized corruption as a key development
challenge, and the need to increase transparency as a
cross-sectoral issue [32].
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example, use of services is increasing: by 2010 people in
Moldova had 6.5 outpatient contacts per person per
year, a number which exceeded the European Union
average of 6.3 contacts [26]. In addition, Moldova com-
pares favorably with other FSU countries on access: a
study in 2010 found that 70 % of respondents saw a
doctor when they felt they needed to, more than in
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Russia or Ukraine [10]. But the specific impact of re-
forms on OOP payment and IP trends is not well
understood.
The objective of this study is to document trends in
OOP payments and IPs in Moldova, looking especially
at how the rate of OOP payments may vary by insurance
status and socio-economic status. We use multiple
sources of data, including desk review of policies and
documents, stakeholder feedback, analysis of annual
Household Budget Survey data and the ad hoc module
on health administered every two years, secondary
analysis of an inpatient survey of OOP payments and
IPs, legal review, and the findings from a policy work-
shop. The study discusses differences in perceptions
about the factors driving formal payments and the
largely hidden practice of IPs, and makes recommenda-
tions to reduce OOP payments and IPs taking into ac-
count values, institutions, and capacities of Moldova’s
health sector.
Methods
In order to address this complex topic we used method-
ology triangulation, blending and integrating multiple
sources of data to increase the credibility and provide evi-
dence of the validity of our analysis [33]. The methods in-
cluded a review of policy documents, a legal review, and
analysis of quantitative household care-seeking and ex-
penditure data. In addition, interviews and focus groups
were conducted to share findings of the analysis with
stakeholders and to incorporate their reactions.
The study was carried out between July 2013 and January
2014 and included three missions in-country and data
analysis. The work was guided by the World Health
Organization (WHO) Country Office in Republic of
Moldova, whose staff conceived of the study and partici-
pated in data collection. Researchers from the Boston Uni-
versity School of Public Health collaborated on the study
design, implementation, data analysis and writing. STROBE
scientific reporting guidelines were followed as appropriate
to a policy analysis of this nature (Additional file 1).
Desk review and initial interviews
The study began with a review of policy documents and
data from Moldova and other countries in the region to
develop a preliminary analytical framework. Thisframework was presented during an in-country mission in
August 2013 in consultation with representatives of the
WHO Country Office in Republic of Moldova. Interviews
were conducted with 24 officials from the Ministry of
Health, CNAM, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS),
the Moldova National Anti-Corruption Centre, develop-
ment partners, civil society organizations, and health
facilities. The analytical framework was then revised based
on the results.Stakeholder feedback
A second visit was conducted in October 2013 to
gather feedback from stakeholders on the analytical
framework and possible policy options. We conducted
7 focus group discussions (FGD), 3 with providers and
administrators, and 4 with patients at two large (>500
bed) hospitals and a Family Medicine Centre in the
Chisinau area, and one district hospital (<450 beds). A
total of 5 administrators and 24 providers (23 doctors
and 1 nurse) participated in the provider focus groups,
and 17 patients or care givers participated in the pa-
tient focus groups. Convenience sampling was used to
gather participants. Sample size was limited by the time
available, but we believe that thematically, saturation
was reached. All participants were told that their par-
ticipation was voluntary and findings would be an-
onymous. No one who was approached refused to
participate. Patient focus groups were 2–6 patients
each. The FGD questions explained that the govern-
ment was concerned about high OOP payments, and
asked questions about motivation for payments people
make for care; advantages and disadvantages of the pay-
ments for the providers and patients; and ideas for re-
form. We also analyzed qualitative data reported from a
2012 study of barriers to care in Moldova for additional
insights [27]. That study was based on analysis of six
focus group discussions with a total of 50 citizens, and
16 in-depth interviews (IDI) with government managers
and public sector social service providers.Legal review
Based on our desk review, and a similar study of health in-
surance law and IPs conducted in Albania [34], we identi-
fied the most pertinent administrative law governing the
insurance reimbursement and patient payment processes,
including English translations of the Law on Compulsory
Health Insurance (No 1585—XIII, 27 Feb 1998) as
amended through 2012 as well as the Government Deci-
sion No 1636 Regarding the Approval of the Type Contract
for Health Care Provision within the Compulsory Health
Insurance, 18 December 2002. We also considered the
main insurer and provider relations influencing OOP pay-
ments and considered provisions related to enforcement of
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while services are covered from public funds.
Quantitative data
We reviewed two sources of data on care seeking behav-
iors and OOP payments for health care services. The
first is a Household Budget Survey (HBS) conducted by
the NBS each month, with data summarized by year.
The nationally representative survey interviews members
of 9,768 randomly selected households each year, strati-
fied by residential area and statistical zones. Respondents
were informed on confidentiality of data and gave writ-
ten informed consent. The response rate was 63.7 % in
2009, 60.5 % in 2010, 66.2 % in 2011, and 60.4 % in
2012. Across the four years, reasons for non-response
were diverse, but the most important reasons were that
the survey was not considered important or respondents
lacked time to fill out questionnaire (about 48 % of non-
respondents on average), or no one at home after three
attempts (30 % of non-respondents) [35]. The section of
the survey which is about health status and health expend-
iture asks about care seeking from providers with a recall
period of 4 weeks for outpatient care and 12 months for in-
patient care. Respondents are queried on OOP payments
related to outpatient care (primary care doctors, specialist
doctors, and diagnostic testing centers), inpatient care
(hospitalization experience), dental care, and medicines
purchased through pharmacies (not including medicines
received free of charge during hospital stay). We examined
data from 2009 to 2012 to calculate the percent of patients
who paid a formal or informal payment at the primary care
level, hospital level, or for medicines purchased as part of
their care in a health facility. The data exclude dental care
and people who only sought care at a pharmacy for self-
treatment. The data allow us to categorize patients as in-
sured versus uninsured, and to analyze results by con-
sumption quintile (1 = poorest, 5 = least poor) as a measure
of socio-economic status. The analysis weighted survey
data to represent the national population [35].
The second data source was an ad hoc module on
health which is collected as part of the HBS. This spe-
cific ad hoc module is implemented every other year, ra-
ther than annually. This module provides data on
reasons for not seeking care when ill. Data were ana-
lyzed for 2008, 2010, and 2012. Sample size for the ad
hoc module was 2,442 households (3,760 respondents)
in 2008, 2,442 households (3,444 respondents) in 2010,
and 1,348 households (including 3,424 respondents) in
2012 [36, 37]. We had approval from the National
Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova to use
the HBS and Ad Hoc Module data.
In addition to the HBS data, we performed a secondary
analysis of a survey conducted in 2011 by the Center for
Health Policies and Studies (PAS), an independent non-governmental organization (NGO) in Moldova. The PAS
report was translated into English from Romanian by an ex-
perienced professional translator. The study approached
5,600 households to select 1,204 people who had been hos-
pitalized in the past 12 months. This study provides a larger
sample of hospitalized patients than the NBS HBS. Finally,
we reviewed data on medical staff salaries from 2006 to
2013 obtained from the Ministry of Health, to compare
with perceptions of low salaries as a driver of IPs.
Policy workshop
A policy workshop was held at the Ministry of Health
in Chisinau on January 31, 2014 to present the study
findings and discuss the policy options. Participants in-
cluded the Minister of Health, Vice Ministers, heads of
services, facility directors, other government agency
representatives, a representative of the Doctors’ League,
and civil society organizations. The insights of work-
shop participants were incorporated into the results.
Analysis
Using the various data sources, we analyzed trends in
total health expenditure, and OOP payments as a pro-
portion of total health expenditures, for Moldova com-
pared to other countries; trends in proportion of people
who experienced a health problem but did not seek care
due to financial reasons; trends in the percentage of
people who made an OOP payment for services received
at outpatient facilities or as an inpatient; and trends in
the percentage of people who paid informally (of those
who paid anything at all). We analyzed how the rate of
OOP payment varied by insurance status (insured versus
uninsured) and by socio-economic status (consumption
quintile). For qualitative data we used inductive thematic
analysis to examine collated data from in-depth inter-
views and focus group discussions to identify patterns of
meaning and to define and name themes [38].
Definitions
OOP payments are defined by the World Bank as “any
direct outlay by households, including gratuities and in-
kind payments, to health practitioners and suppliers of
pharmaceuticals, therapeutic appliances, and other goods
and services whose primary intent” is to enhance or re-
store health status [39]. This includes official user fees at
public facilities as well as fees paid in the private sector. IP
is defined as “a direct contribution, which is made in
addition to any contribution determined by the terms of
entitlement, in cash or in-kind, by patients or others act-
ing on their behalf, to health care providers for services
that the patients are entitled to” [40]. During stakeholder
feedback interviews and focus groups, we found that IPs
are sometimes referred to locally in three categories: con-
ditioned payments (perceived by patients as necessary in
Fig. 1 Types of formal and informal OOP payments in the Republic of Moldova
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voluntarily by patients to obtain something outside the
basic service package entitlement), and gifts (given freely
to express gratitude). See Fig. 1.
Ethics statement
Terms of reference for the study were approved by the
Ministry of Health of the Republic of Moldova, and the
WHO Country Office as a policy analysis. Informed con-
sent was obtained from stakeholders participating in in-
terviews and discussions. No individual level patient
data were collected.
Results
Trends in total health expenditure
Total health expenditure as a proportion of GDP was
11.7 % in 2012, a 75 % increase since 2000 (Table 1).
This share of spending on health is equal to Switzerland
and Canada, and well above the 9.6 % average for OECD
countries [41]. Yet in absolute terms, total spending onhealth is only 490 $US PPP per capita [17], and Moldova
ranked 48th in the WHO European region on this meas-
ure [26]. Moreover, the high proportion of spending on
health in relation to GDP is driven by private spending,
which is least supportive of UHC goals: private health
expenditures comprised 54.5 % of total health expend-
iture in Moldova in 2012, an increase of 5.8 % from
2000 (Table 1). OOP payments by private households
account for 83.2 % of private spending; other sources of
private expenditure on health include 15.8 % by non-
profit institutions serving households, e.g. NGOs (de-
fined by WHO as institutions which are not predomin-
antly financed and controlled by government, that
provide goods or services to households free or at prices
that are not economically significant) and 1 % spending
on private health insurance/other [17]. Thus, private
households’ OOP payment on health as a proportion of
total health expenditures in Moldova is 45.3 %. This is
higher than many other FSU countries such as Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, but lower than Armenia,
Table 1 Trends in health expenditure 2000–2012 selected years, Republic of Moldova
2000 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 % Change
2000–2012
Total Health Expenditure (THE) as % GDP 6.7 10.6 10.9 11.4 12.5 11.7 11.4 11.7 74.6 %
General government expenditure on health (GGHE) as % THE 48.5 44.4 45.2 47.2 48.5 45.8 45.5 45.5 −6.2 %
Private expenditure on health as % THE 51.5 55.6 54.8 52.8 51.5 54.2 54.5 54.5 5.8 %
Private household OOP payment as % of private expenditure on health 83.3 82.9 83.3 85.4 84.8 82.8 82.6 83.2 −0.8 %
Private household OOP payment as % of THE 42.9 46.1 45.6 45.1 43.7 44.9 44.9 45.3 5.7 %
Source: WHO, 2013 [17]
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countries OOP spending was 18 % of total health expendi-
tures [6].
Data from the HBS ad hoc module on health show
that the proportion of people who said they did not seek
care when they needed it due to financial reasons fell by
half, from 29.2 % in 2008 to 14.8 % in 2012 (Table 2).
Among those who had not sought care when they felt
they needed it in 2012, 29.1 % in the poorest quintile
said they could not afford either services or drugs.
Table 2 also highlights that progress has not been equal
in urban versus rural areas: between 2008 and 2012, in
urban areas there was 70.3 % reduction in the percent-
age of the population who did not seek care for financial
reasons, compared with only 38.7 % reduction among
people living in rural areas.
Portion of patients who made OOP payment
Figure 2 shows that the percentage of people making
OOP payment at outpatient facilities has decreased from
19.9 % in 2009 to 16.2 % in 2012. The rate of OOP
payment at inpatient facilities rose from 30.6 % in 2009Table 2 People who experienced a health problem but did not
seek care due to financial reasons (2008–2012, selected years)
Characteristic 2008 2010 2012 % change 2008–2012
Overall 29.2 20.9 14.8 −49.3 %
Residence
Urban 20.9 11.3 6.2 −70.3 %
Rural 36.4 28.3 22.3 −38.7 %
Income Quintile
1 43.6 40.4 29.1 −33.3 %
2 35.4 28.3 24.2 −31.6 %
3 28.0 20.1 16.6 −40.7 %
4 28.3 11.2 7.1 −74.9 %
5 13.4 11.5 5.0 −62.7 %
Insurance Status
Insured 26.5 17.4 12.7 −52.1 %
Not insured 37.6 28.9 20.6 −45.2 %
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Household Budget Survey ad hoc module
on health, collected every other yearto 36.5 % in 2010, but then also started to decline to
30.2 % in 2012. Data from the PAS hospitalized patient
survey showed a somewhat lower rate of formal OOP pay-
ment in hospitals, but a high rate of any hospital-based
OOP payment if we count both formal and informal pay-
ments. The PAS study found that 22.2 % of inpatients had
made formal payments for services provided (defined as
payments made at the cash desk of the inpatient unit),
while 37.9 % made an IP directly to a health worker. If
there was no overlap, the combined percentage of patients
making any OOP payment would be 60.1 %; however,
there is likely overlap between these categories. The NBS
survey data show that the percentage of people who
sought care with a provider and also paid for medicines at
a pharmacy increased 9 % from 64.8 % in 2009 to 70.7 %
in 2012.
Proportion of patients who paid informally
Figure 3 shows that the rate of informal payment in
outpatient settings is fairly steady: of those who made
any OOP payment for care, about 32 % of patients in
2009 reported making an informal payment when seek-
ing outpatient care at a health facility, compared to
36 % of patients in 2012. However, the rate of informal
payment for inpatient care shows a steep increase over
time, from 60 % of patients in 2009 to 82 % of patients
in 2012.
Data from the PAS study provide additional detail on
the types of payments. Of those who made an IP in a
hospital, 61.6 % said they had given willingly (i.e. a gift
such as money or a present), 23.2 % said the payment
was imposed by a health worker (i.e. a conditioned pay-
ment), and 14.7 % said they had given both a gift and a
conditioned payment. Combining categories would sug-
gest that over three-quarters of patients had made a gift,
and over one-third of inpatients surveyed had been
obliged to make an informal payment for services to
which they were entitled.
Taking into account that the majority of people in
Moldova do not report making an OOP payment when
seeking care, the combined probabilities are lower: over-
all, only 5.8 % of all outpatients and 24.6 % of inpatients
reported making an informal payment.
Fig. 2 Percent of patients making OOP payment when seeking care in the last 4 weeks, 2009–2012
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For outpatient OOP payment, uninsured were 3.8 times
more likely to make an OOP payment in 2012 compared
to insured patients (49 % vs. 13 %) (Fig. 4). However, the
data for inpatient care are less clear (Fig. 5). While in 2011,
uninsured inpatients were almost twice as likely to make
an OOP payment as insured patients (59 % vs. 31 %), in
2012, insured patients were more likely to make an OOP
payment (31 % of those with health insurance made an
OOP payment, compared to 18 % of those without
insurance).Rates of OOP payment and socio-economic status
Analysis of OOP payment by socio-economic status
shows that the poor are less likely to make facility-based
OOP payment when seeking outpatient care (Table 3).
In 2012, less than 10 % of patients in consumption quin-
tile 1 (poorest) made an OOP payment for outpatient
facility-based care, compared to 29 % in quintile 5 (least
poor). However, for inpatient care we see no obvious
trend. In 2012, the proportion of inpatients making anOOP payment was virtually the same in quintile 1
(36 %) and quintile 5 (35 %). For medicines, over 77 %
of patients in the poorest quintile who sought facility-
based care also purchased medicines in 2012, compared
to only 57 % of patients in quintile 5.OOP payment amounts
According to NBS data, patients who sought and reported
paying for outpatient care in 2012 paid an average of 231
MDL or €15 Euro for services (median 120 MDL, €8).
Those who reported also paying for medicines paid an
average of 299 MDL or €19 Euro (median 191 MDL, €12).
Patients who reported paying for inpatient care said they
paid 1,253 MDL or €81 Euro (median 600 MDL, €39).
The recall period was 4 weeks for outpatient payment esti-
mates and 12 months for inpatient estimates; data were
not collected on spending on inpatient care plus medi-
cines for this time period. Compared to the average sal-
ary in Moldova (3,550 MDL or €231 Euro per month
[30]), this means that people who pay for care are
spending 7–8 % of monthly income on outpatient
Fig. 3 Percent of patients making an informal payment in the last 4 weeks, of those who made any OOP payment, 2009–2012
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patient care.
Of those inpatients who reported paying a direct pay-
ment in the PAS study, the average amount paid in 2010
was 1,449 MDL or €90 (median 700 MDL or €44). The
recall period was one year. Those who underwent surgical
interventions were 70 % more likely to pay than all other
patients, while those with higher incomes tended to pay
more formally than those with lower incomes. Among the
38 % of patients who made an IP, the average amount paid
was 1,193 MDL or €74 (median 400 MDL or €25).
Perceptions of patients and providers
Drivers of formal OOP payment identified by patients
relate to the limited list of reimbursed drugs, a desire for
services not covered by insurance (such as acupuncture)
and a perception that care is better in the private sector.
Stakeholders also mentioned that patients seek care in
the private sector to avoid waiting lines for procedures
in public facilities. Providers mentioned that these wait-
ing lines are imposed because of ceilings on the number
of procedures which will be reimbursed by the insurance
program due to limited budget. Some stakeholders saidpatients are able to consult with a doctor without
paying, but OOP payment for medicines and diagnostic
tests were harder to avoid. Drivers for IPs mentioned by
patient stakeholders included the desire for faster care
(avoid waiting list), fear that quality would be affected if
you did not pay, and gratitude for a good health out-
come such as the birth of a child. Some patients
described conditioned payments required for surgical
care. Table 4 provides illustrative quotes.
Providers mentioned several reasons for formal OOP
payment, including high tech diagnostic tests which
public hospitals are not able to perform or which are ra-
tioned due to cost (so patients end up seeking care in
the private sector); patients who need a second or third
line medication not covered by insurance, or who prefer
a different medicine from the one on the Reimbursed
Drugs List; and the health needs of patients who have
not purchased insurance or did not obtain a required re-
ferral. Providers believed most IPs were gifts, which they
described as token presents (candy, flowers) or small
amounts of cash given after discharge. Most providers
thought that gift giving is a strong cultural value and
does not cause harm. When asked about the underlying
Fig. 4 Percentage of uninsured and insured outpatients making an OOP payment when seeking care in last four weeks, 2009–2012
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bursement rates from the insurance fund to facilities;
ceilings on the number of cases which the insurance
fund will reimburse; low salaries; over-utilization of ser-
vices (too many referrals for testing, over-prescribing by
doctors); drug advertising and inappropriate self-
treatment by patients; poor quality medicines; and
patient attitudes toward gift giving.
Doctors felt beleaguered by anti-corruption aware-
ness campaigns which they thought inaccurately por-
trayed doctors as corrupt. They believed the press
and household survey reports were exaggerating the
problem of IPs, and that this was negatively affecting
society’s view of the medical profession. “The image
of the doctor is being destroyed because of the image
created by the government through these surveys,”
one doctor said. He warned that if the medical pro-
fession is tarnished, people will begin to leave the
profession creating a doctor shortage. Doctors also
raised the issue that focusing on bribes during the
patient-provider interaction is a way of diverting at-
tention from wrong-doing by senior health officials,i.e. grand corruption which could involve much higher
sums of money or have more deleterious effects.
Discussion
OOP payment mainly driven by medicines
Our study sought to analyze the pervasiveness of OOP
payments and IPs in Moldova and to understand trends
and causes of these payments. The findings suggest that
health reforms to improve financial protection are work-
ing in Moldova: the proportion of people who did not
seek care for financial reasons decreased between 2008
and 2012 from 29.2 to 14.8 %. Yet, access for the very
poor is still a problem, as 29.1 % of the poorest quintile
said they could not afford services or drugs in 2012. In
addition, the rate of OOP payments is still high at
44.9 % of total health expenditures, largely due to spend-
ing on medicines not covered by insurance [10]. Sixteen
percent of outpatients and 30 % of inpatients made an
OOP payment for medical services within a health facil-
ity in 2012. People who pay for care are spending 7–8 %
of monthly income on outpatient episodes, and up to
35 % of monthly income on inpatient care.
Fig. 5 Percentage of uninsured and insured inpatients making an OOP payment when seeking care in last four weeks, 2009–2012
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ended up paying for medicines in 2012, an increase of
9 % since 2009. This suggests that while the policy to ex-
tend free coverage for primary care services has reduced
the likelihood of making OOP payment at outpatient fa-
cilities, access to medicines still requires an ability to
pay. The finding that poorer patients may pay more fre-
quently for medicines than less poor (77 % vs. 57 %) is
difficult to explain, and requires more research to under-
stand how rates of payment may be correlated with
other demographic or systems-level factors.
Payments for medicines are driven by the limited
scope of the Reimbursed Drugs List, prescribing prac-
tices which may shift patients to medicines which are
not reimbursed, the practice of prescribing and using
too many medicines in treatment (“polypharmacy”), and
the high unit prices of medicines [42]. Although all
drugs dispensed at hospitals are 100 % covered for pa-
tients with insurance, most of the medicines prescribed
in outpatient settings are only reimbursed partially, i.e.
50 %, 70 %, 90 %. This means either patients have tomake an OOP payment in a private pharmacy, or some
have suggested that patients try to get hospitalized so
the drugs will be free [27]. Some doctors in public prac-
tice are reportedly prescribing medicines which are not
covered by insurance, possibly due to lack of confidence
in or knowledge about standard treatment guidelines, or
doubts about the quality of medicines on the Reimbursed
Drugs List. These doctors may suggest that a different (gen-
erally more expensive and/or brand name) medicine is bet-
ter. Since laws also permit doctors to have ownership stake
in pharmacies, prescribing patterns may be influenced by
financial benefit to the doctor-owner, or there could be a
kickback relationship between prescriber and pharmacist.
Finally, polypharmacy may be driving up OOP pay-
ment through unnecessary use of medicines. A study
which examined prescriptions written in 2011 found
that 7.8 % of cases showed evidence of over-prescribing by
physicians [42]. In addition, despite a reform to require
doctors to prescribe using INN for medicines in 2012,
some doctors still prescribe using brand names, and gen-
eric substitution by pharmacists is not allowed [42]. This
Table 3 Percent of patients who sought facility-based care and
made an OOP payment, by consumption quintile (1 =most poor,
5 = least poor) and type of care, 2009–2012
Year/Consumption Quintile Outpatient Inpatient Medicines
2009
Quintile 1 (poorest) 7.4 % 26.6 % 70.9 %
Quintile 2 12.9 % 17.3 % 68.8 %
Quintile 3 16.1 % 32.1 % 71.2 %
Quintile 4 18.6 % 37.5 % 69.3 %
Quintile 5 (least poor) 32.0 % 30.7 % 52.4 %
2010
Quintile 1 (poorest) 9.2 % 31.2 % 65.0 %
Quintile 2 11.8 % 20.9 % 76.1 %
Quintile 3 13.5 % 32.5 % 71.7 %
Quintile 4 20.2 % 53.5 % 65.6 %
Quintile 5 (least poor) 31.9 % 33.0 % 57.2 %
2011
Quintile 1 (poorest) 6.9 % 27.2 % 80.0 %
Quintile 2 8.0 % 34.0 % 82.3 %
Quintile 3 10.2 % 20.4 % 81.7 %
Quintile 4 19.9 % 40.3 % 72.5 %
Quintile 5 (least poor) 28.6 % 37.5 % 58.6 %
2012
Quintile 1 (poorest) 9.5 % 36.2 % 77.5 %
Quintile 2 8.7 % 31.5 % 77.9 %
Quintile 3 12.8 % 11.1 % 76.9 %
Quintile 4 13.0 % 30.4 % 71.9 %
Quintile 5 (least poor) 29.2 % 35.0 % 57.4 %
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Household Budget Survey (annual)
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icines are higher than necessary. Patient attitudes may also
be contributing to polypharmacy. For convenience or
because they do not believe doctors have considered all
possible treatment options, patients may seek medicines
at private pharmacies or public pharmacies in primary
health care units without first consulting with a clinician.
Sometimes antibiotics and injectable medicines are sold to
patients without prescription [43].
Polypharmacy and self-treatment can have negative
consequences for health, in addition to increasing
OOP payment: it is harder for patients to adhere fully
to instructions when they are taking multiple medi-
cines, and patients may take incomplete or insufficient
treatments (possibly fueling antimicrobial resistance)
or suffer side effects or drug interactions [44]. Poly-
pharmacy and irrational prescribing are exacerbated
by inadequate supervision of prescribing and lack of
monitoring by government, civil society, and profes-
sional bodies [42].Medicine unit prices are high for a variety of rea-
sons, i.e. procurement agents with limited skills in
price negotiation, restrictive intellectual property
rules, and the country’s small size which limits bar-
gaining power [45]. For formal OOP payment, specific
interventions which could help control the cost of
medicines include stronger quality control measures,
greater transparency in pharmaceutical regulation,
continuous training of doctors, controls to reduce in-
fluence by pharmaceutical representatives, and educa-
tional programs for patients [42, 45]. Depending on
the public budget available, the government could also
consider adding more medicines to the Reimbursed
Drugs List. The latter strategy would not contain total
health expenditures, but it would shift more of the bur-
den of payment from OOP payment to government.
Informal payments declining: drivers and perceptions are
mixed
Our findings suggest that IP rates may be declining
over time. In a 2007 study, 48 % of people in
Moldova reported that IPs were sometimes or always
needed to access health care services [46]. In contrast,
in our study only 5.8 % of outpatients and 24.6 % of
inpatients reported making IPs when seeking care.
These data are lower than patterns documented in the
Transparency International (TI) Corruption Barometer
2013 survey, which reported 38 % of people in Moldova
said they had had to pay something informally to access
care. Discrepancies may be due to differences in survey
methods (the TI study uses a 12 month recall period for
all respondents, while the NBS survey uses a one month
recall period for outpatients and 12 months for inpatients;
in addition TI survey respondents were asked to report on
behavior of anyone living in the household, not just their
own behavior). NBS data confirm that IPs are mainly a
problem in hospitals, while the PAS study provides evi-
dence that patients most frequently think of these pay-
ments as gifts.
The drivers of IPs in Moldova—fear that people may
not be able to get care of good quality otherwise, desire
for faster care, and an expression of gratitude—are
similar to reasons documented in Hungary [47, 48],
Albania [49, 50], and other countries [11]. Re-
searchers in Hungary found that people who have
accepting attitudes toward IPs are more likely to
think IPs are expressions of gratitude, and to believe
that services are underfunded and doctors are not
well paid [51]. Some providers in Moldova did sug-
gest that low salaries are driving IPs, and salary data
support this assumption to an extent. We found that
the annualized physician salary in Moldova including
15 % vacancy pay is 8,774 US$PPP, or about 1.4 times
the average wage rate in the country.1 A study
Table 4 Drivers of formal and informal payments
Formal payment Informal payment
Medicine is not covered by insurance Desire for faster care
The hospital gives some medicines, but [a patient] might need an
expensive one the hospital doesn’t have. – Patient FGD 2013
I said ‘I can pay.’ The physician is happy and I am happy. And I did not stay in
line. –IDI 2012, insured male
If you want your child to be healthy and get well, you need to pay a
lot for medicines. – Patient FGD 2013
I leave some money on the table. If you go downstairs to the payment office, when
you come back the doctor is already busy and you have to wait. It is easier to pay
him/her directly. –IDI 2012, uninsured male
Sense that inexpensive medicines in public sector must not be
good quality, and that “better” medicines are offered in private
sector
Fear of poor quality:
How can a drug be good if it costs 10 times less than another
medicine? – Provider FGD 2013
When I was hospitalized, there were some people telling us we shouldn’t pay since
we had health insurance…But I was paying anyway to assure myself that everything
would be fine. I was very worried and I just wanted to know that everything would
be OK. –IDI 2012, insured female
If you don’t want the hospital’s drugs, but you want your own
drugs, then you have to purchase them. – Patient FGD 2013
The relatives pay the staff to tend their patient since there aren’t enough staff and
the staff can’t take care of all the patients. The staff aren’t asking for these payments,
but the relatives are paying. – Patient FGD 2013
Service not covered by insurance
The acupuncture treatment …is expensive and not covered by
insurance. – Patient FGD 2013
Unless you put some cash in their pockets, they won’t even look at you…they don’t
even come close to you and don’t even check on you…I noticed an immediate
change after we paid. They looked after [my wife] and came regularly to check on
her. The workers from there expected to be paid.
–IDI 2012, insured male
Uninsured or not referred Wish to thank providers
[People prefer] to pay for a hospitalization and medicines rather
than purchasing insurance. – Patient FGD 2013
For the birth of my two children, I gave money. Nobody forced me. I gave 5000 or
6000 lei (317–380 euro) with all my heart. – IDI 2012, insured male
If I wanted to see the specialist right away, I would have had to pay.
– Patient FGD 2013
I think it is normal, not forced. – Patient FGD 2013
About informal payments, I think it is something about individuals giving flowers
and candies. No one is imposing this. – Patient FGD 2013
Source: Stakeholder feedback (focus groups and in-depth interviews) collected in October 2013; qualitative data from previous research (WHO, 2012 [27])
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the average wage in 14 OECD countries found that
remuneration of GPs varies from twice the average
wage in Finland and Czech Republic to 3.5 times
greater than average wage in the United States and
Iceland, so in comparison with this benchmark salar-
ies in Moldova are on the low side. Unlike other FSU
countries, Moldova does not have a problem of ex-
cess physicians having to share a limited health
budget for personnel: the country had 313 doctors
per 100,000 population in 2009, compared to 330 per
100,000 for the WHO European Region [26]. How-
ever, other studies suggest that raising wages alone is
not enough to deter corrupt practices such as bribe
seeking [52], and that efforts should try to link pay
to performance [53, 54].
Attitudes toward the payments may influence the
type of IP: for example, in Turkey being grateful or
following customs is a reason for in-kind gifts
(50 %), but is rarely a driver for cash IPs [55]. Fur-
ther analysis of Moldova data in the future might ex-
plore such differences.Protecting patient interests through incentive systems,
enforcement, and information
Compulsory IPs are thought to be more deleterious to
health outcomes, both because they deter the poor from
accessing services, but also because they affect resource
allocation in such a way that services are not used by
those who would benefit most [11, 56]. Although the
rate of IP in Moldova appears low and motivated in
large part by gratitude or customs, policy makers should
still be worried about the one-third of payments in hos-
pitals that are not gifts, and the fact that financial access
is still a problem for the very poor. To control IPs,
policy makers should consider strengthening CNAM
contractual provisions to ban IPs and to deduct payment
from providers whose employees continue to accept
them. The Health Insurance Law could be amended to
specify that demand for payments other than those au-
thorized under the insurance program is an attempt to
violate the rights of the insured and would incur defined
penalties. Members of the insurance program could be
provided with information on covered services and med-
icines, permitted copayments, percentage of the cost of
Vian et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:319 Page 13 of 15medicines covered, and generic medicine equivalents.
Such information is available now in the main hall of
medical institutions and in some pharmacies, but the in-
formation is difficult to find and not presented in an eas-
ily digested form. Some work is needed to improve
methods and instruments for communication of informa-
tion to insurance members in ways that target vulnerable
populations and truly increase patient understanding. In-
sured patients should also know how to access and feel
comfortable using grievance redress mechanisms, an im-
portant anti-corruption strategy [57, 58]. Other strategies
to consider include increasing individual incentives
for providers through revised payment structures em-
phasizing performance-based payment [59, 60], and
incentivizing organizations by awarding grants to fa-
cilities to support innovative strategies to increase
transparency, as has been done in Mongolia [61] and
Vietnam [62].
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, because of the
way data were collected in the HBS, it does not include
people who only sought care at a pharmacy for self-
treatment (an estimated 31.4 % of patients self-treat at
pharmacies or alternative care providers). As such, our
figures may under-estimate the total proportion of
people making any OOP for medicines. This is potentially
important especially as prescriptions are not fully enforced
and many medicines are available in the pharmacies with-
out prescription allowing self-treatment. In addition, due
to problems in quality of HBS data we were not able to
analyze household expenditures for dental care. The ma-
jority of dental care is paid directly through OOP payment
and only emergency dental care is covered by the public
insurance program. Additional analysis should be con-
ducted to understand the role of dental care as a driver of
OOP payment.
A second limitation of the study is that we had limited
data sources for monitoring IP practice and could not
measure how these payments may vary with socio-
economic status and with insurance status. Future stud-
ies should try to measure changes in the practice of
making IPs of various types (e.g. facilitation payments,
gifts, compulsory payments) and correlate IPs with other
demographic factors. Our qualitative interviews and
focus groups also were limited in geographic scope due
to budget constraints; however, the analysis raised
themes which were similar to those documented previ-
ously in Moldova, suggesting that the issues we identi-
fied are persistent concerns. Finally, our legal analysis
was limited to laws which were translated into English.
Although the most important laws and amendments
were available in English, it is possible that our legal
review omitted documents which describe paymentcontrol procedures and exist only in the Romanian
language.
Conclusion
UHC embodies the goal of effective health coverage; that
is, to increase the probability that individuals will receive
the health interventions that they need with appropriate
quality, and that the costs involved do not erode
financial protection. Health reforms adopted by the
government of Moldova have helped to improve access
to care on average from 2008 to 2012, and the rate of
primary care consultations per capita is high. During
past few years important stakeholders including govern-
ment leaders and citizens, have become concerned about
OOP payment and this topic has reached the policy
agenda of the health authorities and beyond. However,
factors documented in our research suggest that there
may still be unmet needs in Moldova and that financial
protection is not yet assured. Continuing issues include
the limited list of reimbursed medicines (which results
in patients purchasing medicines OOP), failure of
government to motivate generic prescribing and rational
use of medicines, perceptions of patients and providers
that better medicines and higher quality healthcare ser-
vices are available in the private sector, and continued
compulsory informal payments for some services in the
hospital sector. Moreover, data suggest there are differ-
ences in access to services by place of residence, income
and insurance status which are a cause for concern. On
the positive side, there is broad recognition of the need to
strengthen governance and reduce expectations for infor-
mal payment in all sectors and throughout government.
The Ministry of Health and CNAM need to continue
working with other stakeholders in the country to
strengthen transparency and accountability with particular
focus on the supply side including health care providers.
This can be complemented with expansion of insurance
coverage to move forward on the path to universal health
coverage while targeting also equitable access to care.Endnotes
1Often doctors can occupy more than one vacancy and
their monthly salary will increase accordingly. According
to statistics, on average they occupy (accumulate) up to
1.25 vacancies. Exchange and conversion rates obtained
from Ministry of Health as of October 2013.
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